This paper compares the estimates of the two most widely used non-structural models for market power measurement in banking, namely the conduct parameter method and the revenue test, as applied to a panel of Greek banks over the period [1993][1994][1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004]. We also propose a dynamic reformulation of these models within a panel data context, in order to address possible statistical problems associated with the dynamic nature of bank-level data. The results suggest that both static methods provide lower estimates of market power relative to their dynamic counterparts. Therefore, the inclusion of some dynamics in the models, even though it increased estimation complexity, helped to reveal some collusive behavior of banks.
Introduction
In the banking sector, prudential regulation and competition policy are in many respects intertwined, while the soundness and stability of the system may in various ways be influenced by the degree of competition and concentration. Enhanced competition may have a deleterious impact on stability if it causes banks' charter value to drop, thus reducing the incentives for prudent risk-taking behavior. A more concentrated system, inasmuch as it implies the presence of a few relatively large banks, is more likely to display a "too big to fail" problem, by which large banks increase their risk exposure anticipating the unwillingness of the regulator to let the bank default in the event of insolvency problems (Hughes and Mester, 1998) . Any market failure, inefficiency, or anticompetitive conduct among banks is likely to impose more severe costs throughout the economy than would similar defects in many other industries; thus it becomes particularly important to understand the causes and consequences of competition in the banking industry. In this respect, the first and most important step is the robust estimation of the degree of imperfectly competitive conduct.
Recent trends in empirical industrial organization have popularized the use of nonstructural approaches to measure market power. These approaches, that came to be known as the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) models, provide empirically implementable techniques for the analysis of non-competitive behavior in production and cost structure. The way to these approaches has been paved by a number of forerunners, with the two most popular models being those of Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) , and Panzar and Rosse (1987) . Bresnahan and Lau (BL) , in a line of research termed conduct parameter method (CPM) thereafter, parameterize the extent to which firms perceive a distinction between marginal revenue and price. On the other hand, in the Panzar and Rosse (PR) model, market power is measured by the extent to which changes in factor prices are reflected in revenue. In other words, this revenue test (RT) involves estimating a reducedform equation relating gross revenue to a vector of input prices and other control variables.
While each of the two approaches nurtures its own theoretical discourse, they should not be viewed as mutually exclusive but, more eclectically, as complementary tests.
Whereas there is fairly extensive application of these models to banking, there is a limited body of work that compares their results. The purpose of this study is to fill this gap, using a panel dataset of Greek banks during the period [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . Furthermore, we propose a dynamic reformulation of the static versions of the CPM and the RT within a dynamic panel data context. The most common motivation for also using a dynamic approach is the statistical importance of accounting for short-run dynamics in the data.
Further, the formulation solves the inference problem when using non-stationary data (Steen and Salvanes, 1999) . Finally, the dynamic nature of the Greek banking industry and certain changes in the regulatory environment may bias the resulting implications if only static models are considered.
We present and describe some important dynamic factors of the Greek banking sector, such as the patterns of consolidation and concentration, the changes in the regulatory framework, and the liberalization process that occurred during the sample period. The presence of these factors may lead to different adjustment costs, which in turn make static models inadequate. Indeed, the results suggest that both static methods (CPM and RT) tend to provide lower estimates of market power compared to their dynamic counterparts. In light of recent critiques of the NEIO approach to measuring anticompetitive conduct (e.g. Corts, 1999) , this has important implications for public and private policy-makers alike.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the two theoretical non-structural models applied in the current study, and Section 3 is then devoted to the analysis of the empirical static and dynamic versions of these models. Section 4 outlines the institutional structure of the Greek banking system and offers a discussion on the dataset. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical evidence of applying the models to the Greek banking sector, while some conclusions are offered in the final section.
Theoretical framework
The literature on the measurement of competition can be divided into two major streams: structural and non-structural. The structural approach embraces the structureconduct-performance and the efficiency hypotheses. These two models investigate, respectively, whether a highly concentrated market causes collusive behavior among the larger banks, resulting in superior market performance, or whether it is the efficiency of larger banks that enhances their performance. Although these hypotheses lack formal theoretical support by traditional microeconomic theory, they have frequently been employed empirically in the banking industry (e.g. Evanoff and Fortier, 1988; Bourke, 1989 ).
However, owing to several deficiencies arising from the application of the structural approach, 1 developments in industrial organization, as well as the recognition of the need to endogenize the market structure, many empirical studies followed a new course. The novelty to competition evaluation has emerged under the impulse of the NEIO approach (Carlton and Perloff, 2005) . This approach, pioneered by Iwata (1974) and strongly enhanced by the papers of Bresnahan (1982 Bresnahan ( , 1989 , Lau (1982) , and Panzar and Rosse (1987) , tests competition and the use of market power, and stresses the analysis of banks'
competitive conduct in the absence of structural measures. Specifically, each of these techniques attempts to measure the competitive conduct of banks without explicitly using information on the structure of the market.
The first model, the Iwata model, allows the estimation of conjectural variation values for individual banks supplying a homogeneous product in an oligopolistic market (Iwata, 1974) . This measure, to the best of our knowledge, has been applied to the banking industry only once, by Shaffer and DiSalvo (1994) , for a duopolistic banking market (in South Central Pennsylvania). 2 They find that banks' conduct is imperfectly competitive, but closer to perfect competition than one would expect, given the very high degree of concentration in the market.
The conduct parameter method (CPM)
The second model, which has been applied to the banking sector in a number of studies, is based on the procedure first suggested by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) and further elucidated in Bresnahan's (1989) survey of the NEIO. 3 It requires the estimation of a simultaneous-equation model, where a parameter representing the degree of market power of firms is included. The basis of the test is the established principle that, in equilibrium, profit-maximizing firms will choose prices or quantities such that marginal 2 Applying this model to the banking industry is difficult, particularly where micro data for the cost and production structure for homogeneous products are scarce.
cost equals their perceived marginal revenue, which coincides with the demand price under perfect competition and with the industry's marginal revenue under perfect collusion. As such, the key parameter in this test is interpreted as the extent to which the average firm's perceived marginal revenue schedule deviates from the demand schedule, thus representing the degree of market power actually exercised by the firms in the sample.
In this respect, consider a non-competitive industry in which N banks produce a homogeneous output Q, facing a market demand function of the following stylized form:
where D is the demand function, P is the market price of industry output Q, Z is a vector of exogenous variables affecting demand (often including some variable measuring the general economic activity), α is the demand parameter vector, and ε is a stochastic disturbance.
On the supply side, the representative bank i, (i {1, 2,…, N}) is assumed to maximize profits by solving the following one-shot game in output level:
where (for the ith bank), q i is the output level, p i is the respective price imposed, C is the cost function (which for now is homogeneous across all banks in the industry), and w i is the price vector of inputs. The optimality condition corresponding to this problem is given by the following inverse supply relation:
where MC is the marginal cost function.
, that is the conjectural variation coefficient of the NEIO literature. As λ i moves farther from zero, the conduct of bank i moves farther from that of a perfect competitor. Thus, the (average) conjectural variation coefficient will reveal what kind of imperfectly competitive behavior characterizes the market, and there is no need to impose any a priori restriction on it. In other words, it is not necessary to assume a certain conduct beforehand and test for its propriety.
Moreover, in Eq. (3), represents the semi-elasticity of market demand, that is
, which is a function of aggregate output and other exogenous variables (Bresnahan, 1982) . Shaffer (1993) 
i is simply the output share of the ith bank. In the case of perfect competition, λ i = 0; under pure monopoly, λ i =1; and, finally, λ i < 0 would imply pricing below marginal cost and could result, for example, from a non-optimizing behavior of banks. Clearly, aggregation implies that the average value of λ i across all banks equals the industry's conjectural elasticity, defined as L, the latter having the same properties as λ i .
Thus, this framework provides a benchmark, which can be used to identify the actual underlying market structure.
The revenue test (RT)
The PR (1987) approach (initially developed by Rosse and Panzar, 1977) for measuring market power relies on the premise that each bank will employ a different pricing strategy in response to a change in input costs, depending on the market structure in which this bank operates. In other words, market power is measured by the extent to which changes in factor prices (unit price of funds, capital, and labor) are reflected in revenue.
The authors define a measure of competition, the H-statistic, as the sum of the elasticities of the reduced-form revenue function with respect to factor prices. Thus, the H-statistic represents the percentage variation of the equilibrium revenue derived from an infinitesimal percent increase in the price of all factors used by the firm. Panzar and Rosse (1987) show that this statistic can reflect the structure and conduct of the market to which the firm belongs. They assert that the H-statistic is negative when the competitive structure is a monopoly, a perfectly colluding oligopoly, or a conjectural variations short-run oligopoly; an increase in input prices will increase marginal costs, reduce equilibrium output, and subsequently reduce revenue. 4 Under perfect competition, where banks' products are regarded as perfect substitutes of one another, the Chamberlinian model, based on free entry of banks and determining not only the output level but also the equilibrium number of banks, produces the perfectly competitive solution, as demand elasticity approaches infinity. Thus, in this case, the H-statistic is equal to unity. Shaffer (1982) shows that the H-statistic is also unity for a natural monopoly operating in a perfectly contestable market and also for a sales-maximizing firm that is subject to 4 In the case where the monopolist faces a demand curve of constant price elasticity (i.e. e > 1) and where a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology is employed, Panzar and Rosse proved that H is equal to e-1. Hence, apart from the sign, the magnitude of H may also be of importance, as H yields an estimate of the Lerner index of monopoly power L = (e-1)/e = H/(H-1) (see Bikker and Haaf, 2002) . breakeven constraints. Consequently, an increase in input prices raises both marginal and average costs without altering the optimal output of a bank. Exit from the market will evenly increase the demand faced by each of the remaining banks, thereby leading to an increase in prices and total revenue by the same amount as the rise in costs (i.e. demand is perfectly elastic). Finally, if the H-statistic is between zero (inclusive) and unity (exclusive), the market structure is characterized by monopolistic competition. Under monopolistic competition, potential entry leads to contestable market equilibrium, and income increases less than proportionally to the input prices, as the demand for banking products facing individual banks is inelastic.
When applying the RT to assess banks' market conduct, various assumptions about banks' production activity have to be made. First, the methodology requires assuming that banks are treated as single-product firms, producing intermediation services by using labor, physical capital, and financial capital as inputs. Second, one needs to assume that higher input prices are not associated with higher quality services that may generate higher revenue, since such a correlation may bias the computed H-statistic. Yet, if one rejects the hypothesis of a contestable competitive market, this bias cannot be too large (Molyneux et al., 1996) . Among other underlying assumptions inherent in the PR model, we can mention that: (a) banks are profit-maximizing firms; (b) the performance of these banks needs to be influenced by the actions of other market participants; (c) the cost structure is homogeneous; and (d) the price elasticity of demand is greater than unity (see also De Bandt and Davis, 2000) . Finally, a limitation of the RT is that any monopsony power or upward-sloping aggregate supply curve of any essential input (such as deposits) would render econometric identification an issue. Monopsony power, by tending to drive up input prices (and hence equilibrium revenues) as a function of scale, would tend to yield higher values of H and thereby mask any market power present on the output side, in contrast to the CPM (Shaffer, 2004) .
Despite these assumptions, the RT is a valuable tool in assessing market conditions, mainly owing to its simplicity and transparency, without lacking efficiency. Moreover, data availability becomes much less of a constraint, since revenue is more likely to be observable compared to output prices. Also, by utilizing bank-level data, this approach allows for bank-specific differences in the production function. In addition, the nonnecessity to define the location of the market a priori implies that the potential bias caused by the misspecification of market boundaries is avoided; hence for a bank that operates in more than one market, the H-statistic will reflect the average of the bank's conduct in each market. 
Empirical specification
This section aims to identify robust econometric procedures for applying both nonstructural models of market power described above. As Bresnahan (1989) states, only econometric problems, not fundamental theoretical problems, could cloud inference on the empirical results of these models. To this end, the econometric methodology to be followed is afforded particular consideration.
CPM
5 Owing to the reasons described above the revenue test has been extensively applied to the banking industry. For a thorough review see Mamatzakis et al. (2005) .
The general empirical problem in studies relying on a CPM is the identification of the elasticity concept L. Using the results of Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) 
6 Applications of the Bresnahan-Lau method in the banking industry have favored linear demand functions with one or two cross-product terms (Shaffer, 1999; Toolsema, 2002; etc.) . Sjoberg (2004) uses a log-linear demand function, with one cross-product term (namely price of output times the exogenous variable), while Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) use a log-linear demand function with a number of explanatory variables, mainly corresponding to the quality of loans. We too have undertaken a log-linear demand function; however the changes in the coefficients on L are negligible. 7 Given that data on a substitute price of individual banks are really hard to find (one would require bank-level data on the price of securities) we opt for an aggregate demand function.
Regarding the functional form imposed on the supply relation, the differentiation in the literature is broader than in the respective one imposed on the demand relation.
According to the purpose of each study, the cost function has been given a linear, minflex Laurent, translog, generalized Leontief, or Fourier functional form. The appropriate choice rests on the assumptions of each study, the number of outputs specified, and the level of flexibility required. We have relied on the generalization of the minflex Laurent since, as Barnett and Lee (1985) suggest, even though models produced from second order Taylor Shaffer (1999) . 9 Symmetry in the coefficients of output is irrelevant as we consider the one-output case. Symmetry in the coefficients of inputs would be necessary if we estimated different parameters for a pair of cross-product terms of the flexible functional form. Here we rely on estimation of the marginal cost function. above hypotheses are not rejected at the 5 per cent level. Therefore, we do not impose any initial restrictions. Finally, note that the measurement of the term , as well as the dependent variable at the bank level, while not consistent with the profit-maximizing solution (since a quantity game was considered), allows for heterogeneity in marginal costs and in the price setting policy, respectively (on this issue see Tsutsui and Uchida, 2002 and Sjoberg, 2004) .
For L to be correctly specified in Eq. (5) it is necessary to treat the input prices as exogenously given. This assumption seems reasonable, at least as far as the markets for labor and physical capital are concerned, because banks face intense competition for these inputs from other banks as well as non-bank firms. The market for funds will also be treated as competitive based on the argument that depositors today have many other tempting saving options (such as government and corporate bonds and the stock markets), which exert a competitive pressure upon banks' deposit rate policy. To the extent that this is not true, i.e. that bank have some degree of market power in the deposit market, it has been shown (Shaffer, 1999 ) that this will not escape identification and that it will simply be misattributed to the asset side (consequently L will be strengthened).
For empirical implementation purposes, the CPM has to be embedded within a stochastic framework. Thus, we assume that Eqs. (4) and (5) are stochastic owing to errors in optimization. Introducing the additive disturbance terms in System {(4), (5)}, the latter is specified as:
The disturbance vectors ε and u are assumed to be iid as multivariate N ~ (0, Σ), where Σ is a positive definite matrix.
As discussed previously, equations in the latter system are interrelated, because of the underlying CPM, through the endogeneity of the semi-elasticity of market demand, which appears in the supply equation. Thus, we should employ a system estimator such as nonlinear three-stage least squares (3SLS), generalized method of moments (GMM) 10 or full information maximum likelihood (FIML). We have applied all three methodologies, with the results being similar, yet we have resorted to the 3SLS method (as most of the relevant literature) for two main reasons. First, the FIML estimator is the asymptotically efficient estimator only under the assumption of normally distributed residuals (see Amemiya, 1977) . We tested for normality using the Jarque-Bera statistic, which is significant at the 1 per cent level, thus ruling against normality. Second, use of different instruments does not significantly alter the results in the 3SLS case, while in the GMM case the variability is larger. Therefore, we proceed with the estimation of System (6) using a 3SLS procedure.
A crucial feature of the CPM is that the variables involved are usually characterized by short-run dynamics, which are not accounted for in the static equations. Further, a reformulation of the static model to a dynamic one may help with the inference problem when using non-stationary data or when severe autocorrelation in the demand equation is present (Toolsema, 2002) . Steen and Salvanes (1999) developed a dynamic version of the Bresnahan and Lau model, based on an error-correction (ECM) framework. They applied it to the French market for fresh salmon, using time series data. Toolsema (2002) opted for applying this model to the Dutch consumer credit market. However, multicollinearity in the demand equation and difficulty in identifying a purely exogenous Z variable (so as the demand function will not be separable in Z) are problems that she could not overcome, thus failing to estimate the model. We have closely followed her approach and indeed multicollinearity seems to be a major problem when using time series data.
Given the above, we opt for the following dynamic representation of the demand equation (autoregressive-distributed lag model): 
which is derived as a static conditional demand equation, assuming the same technology as in the static case and with dynamics resulting from an AR(1) disturbance. 11 As we do not impose the implied common factor restrictions, the dynamics may be thought of as an empirical approximation to some more general adjustment process (Blundell and Bond, 1998) . This is equivalent to identifying the short-run relationships, which are of main interest in this study.
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Similarly, we specify the dynamic supply equation of the CPM as:
10 Reference here is made to the GMM estimator developed by Hansen (1982) . 11 To decide that lag length is equal to 1, we used the Ljung-Box Q-statistic (Ljung and Box, 1979) . The results ensured that no serial correlation was present in the residuals (the maximum lag length used was 3). Indeed, we did not expect a higher order autocorrelation due to the use of annual data. 12 Alternatively, we may rely on an ECM specification (as in Steen and Salvanes, 1999) , which could allow distinction between the long-and short-run effects. However, this (i) would preferably require panel where , , and c
(8) is non-linear in its parameters and therefore requires a non-linear estimation procedure.
Since we cannot simultaneously estimate the System {(7), (8)} (a non-linear system estimator for dynamic panels is not available) we proceed in two steps. First, to account for the simultaneity problem, Eq. (7) is estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS), as in Steen and Salvanes (1999) proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . This estimator cointegration techniques, which are difficult to apply here because of the relatively small time dimension of the panel, (ii) is more demanding in terms of degrees of freedom, and (iii) is not directly comparable to the dynamic Panzar-Rosse model described below. 13 Again the Ljung-Box Q-statistic ensures serial correlation of order not higher than 1. 14 Binder et al. (2003) and Baltagi (2005) , among others, suggest that in panels with a small time dimension and a larger cross-sectional dimension (which is usually the case in the relevant literature), instrumental variables and GMM estimators based only on standard orthogonality conditions break down if the underlying time series contain unit roots.
combines the T-2 equations in differences with the T-2 equations in levels into a single system. It uses the lagged levels of dependent and independent variables as instruments for the difference equation and the lagged differences of dependent and independent variables as instruments for the level equation. This estimation procedure is especially appropriate when: (i) the cross sectional dimension is large compared to the time dimension of the panel; (ii) some explanatory variables are endogenous; and (iii) unobserved bank-specific effects are correlated with other regressors; all three criteria are relevant in the present analysis. Also, this estimator does not break down in the presence of unit roots (for a proof see Binder et al., 2003) . We choose the two-step estimator, since it is asymptotically more efficient than the respective one-step estimator, and we account for its downward bias by using the finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2000) . We use Z and a linear time trend as "GMM-style" instruments (for a discussion see Arellano and Bond, 1991) .
To determine whether our instruments are valid in the system GMM approach, we use the specification tests proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) . First, we apply the Sargan test, a test of over-identifying restrictions, to determine any correlation between instruments and errors. For an instrument to be valid, there should be no correlation between the instrument and the error terms. The null hypothesis is that the instruments and the error terms are independent. Thus, failure to reject the null hypothesis could provide evidence that valid instruments are used. Second, we test whether there is a second order serial correlation with the first differenced errors. The GMM estimator is consistent if there is no second order serial correlation in the error term of the firstdifferenced equation. The null hypothesis in this case is that the errors are serially uncorrelated. Thus, failure to reject the null hypothesis could supply evidence that valid orthogonality conditions and instruments are used.
RT
As in Shaffer (2004) 
where it is the subscript indicating bank i at time t, TR stands for a bank's real total revenue, w 1 , w 2 and w 3 are the three input prices, and TA stands for real total assets. The log specification is used to improve the regression's goodness of fit and to reduce possible simultaneity bias (De Bandt and Davis, 2000) . Molyneux et al. (1996) found that a loglinear revenue equation gives results similar to those of a more flexible translog equation.
The revenue equation is interpreted as a reduced form rather than as a structural equation (Shaffer, 2004 ).
As discussed above, the H-statistic is equal to the sum of the elasticities of total revenue with respect to the three input prices, i. Chamberlinian equilibrium model provides a simple link between the H-statistic and the number of banks, and thus between market behavior and market structure. Vesala (1995) proves that the H-statistic is an increasing function of the demand elasticity e, that is, the less market power is exercised, the higher the H-statistic becomes. This implies that the Hstatistic is not used solely to reject certain types of market behavior, but that its magnitude serves as a measure of competition. One of the general assumptions underlying the Chamberlinian equilibrium model mentioned above is that e is a non-decreasing function of the number of rival banks. Vesala's result, together with this latter assumption, provides a positive (theoretical) relationship between H and the number of banks, or -in a looser interpretation -an inverse relationship between H and banking concentration. Hence, the more negative the H-statistic is, the larger is the monopoly markup, while the closer the Hstatistic is to unity, the more competitive is the market (Vesala, 1995; Barajas et al., 2000) .
Input prices are measured as in the CPM. As regards TA, a positive coefficient is expected, as a higher volume of output envisages greater revenue. Furthermore, causation may run from TR to assets if bank managers tend to retain marginal changes in earnings rather than distributing them to shareholders, thus raising assets, or if banks that expect to have better performance credibly transmit this information through expansion of the asset base. Therefore, TA should be treated as an endogenous variable and, consequently, an instrumental variable panel data estimation method is required. We resort to a two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure under a random effects (RE) model.
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The dynamic extension of the Panzar-Rosse model is less demanding than the equivalent CPM, since it is linear in the parameters and does not require system estimation. A critical feature of the H-statistic is that the test must be undertaken on observations that are in long-run equilibrium. The empirical test for equilibrium is justified on the grounds that competitive capital markets will equalize the risk-adjusted rate of returns across banks, so that, in equilibrium, rates of return should not be correlated statistically with input prices. Therefore, to test for equilibrium, one can calculate the Hstatistic (H n ) using the rates of return, instead of total revenue, as the dependent variable in the regression equation. All authors use a regression relating return on assets to input prices. However, the argument also holds if the return on equity is used as the dependent variable instead (Molyneux et al., 1996; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2002; Bikker and Haaf, 2002) . A value of H n < 0 would show non-equilibrium, whereas H n = 0 would prove equilibrium. However, if the sample is not in long-run equilibrium, it is true that H < 0 no longer proves monopoly, but it remains also true that H > 0 disproves monopoly or conjectural variation short-run oligopoly (Shaffer, 2004) .
Data description and analysis

An overview of the Greek banking industry
Since the mid-1990s, the Greek financial and banking landscape has changed rapidly as a result of the new regulatory framework characterizing the market. While the number of commercial banks operating in the Greek banking system remained almost unchanged since 1993, the number of those banks' branches and employees has increased significantly (see Table 1 ). During this period, a number of new, mainly small, commercial banks opened and a series of mergers and acquisitions were 16 The indirect control comes from the majority equity participation of public pension funds, municipalities and other funds, or from equity holdings of other state-owned or state-controlled banks. 17 The largest credit institution, the National Bank of Greece, has come to a large degree into non-state ownership, and may be considered to operate largely on private economy criteria, while the fifth largest bank, Emporiki Bank (also known as Commercial Bank of Greece), is in the process of disentanglement of the Greek state. The above-mentioned developments in the structure of the Greek banking system resulted in significant modifications in the balance sheet and profit and loss accounts.
More notably, the ratio of net interest income to average total assets (i.e. the net interest margin) of Greek commercial banks increased considerably during the examined period, The high proportion of operating expenses is related to the specific features of the Greek banking system, such as the high number of branches of large banks and the fact that the products offered are relatively limited (Hondroyiannis et al., 1999) . However, although
Greek banks' operating expenses relative to their average total assets remain above the 
Data
The models specified above are used in order to examine the level of competition in the Greek banking industry during the period 1993-2004. All bank-level data are taken from Balance Sheet Accounts and Income Statements published annually by the Greek 20 Several factors have been responsible for the high rates of growth of bank lending, including the relativelyhigh rate of growth of the Greek economy, the convergence of Greek lending rates to those in the rest of the euro area, the enhancement of competition among credit institutions, especially with regard to extending credit to households, and the release of commercial bank funds from the Bank of Greece due to the harmonization of reserve requirements in the Eurosystem.
banks included in the sample. The macroeconomic data (national income and Greek
Treasury bond rates) were drawn from Eurostat and the Bank of Greece.
Our sample covers all Greek commercial banks, plus a foreign-owned credit institution, namely Bank of Cyprus. The institutions that do not publish profit and loss statements, i.e. branches of foreign banks and certain specialized credit institutions, are not included in the sample. 21 Specialized credit institutions and smaller cooperative banks are also excluded from the analysis, since (i) their operations differ substantially from those of the mainstream commercial banks and (ii) sometimes they have a different legal form.
Last, we omit investment banks and banks focusing in corporate banking, since they fail to meet the criterion of being a well-rounded commercial banking institution (universal credit institution). The number of credit institutions included in the sample ranges from 13 to 23 commercial banks in each year of the examined period (see Table 2 ). In all examined years, the banks included in the sample accounted for a significant proportion of total banking assets (around 80 per cent).
The output variable in the CPM (namely Q when referring to the industry's total output and q when referring to the individual bank's output) is defined as the value of total bank assets in real terms (in million euros). The unit price of output (namely P at the market level and p at the bank level) is measured as interest income over total assets. The choice of cost, price and output variables follows either the intermediation or the production approach. According to the intermediation approach, banks are considered as financial intermediaries that combine deposits together with purchased inputs to produce bank assets. Total cost includes interest expenses and operating expenses, i.e. staff costs and administrative expenses. In the alternative production approach, banks utilize capital and labor inputs to produce outputs of loans and deposit accounts. In this paper we follow the intermediation approach. The three input variables are defined as follows:
Labor (L): Defined as total number of employees.
Physical capital (K): Defined as fixed assets, including tangible fixed assets (land, lots, buildings and installations, furniture, office equipment, etc., less depreciation), as well as intangible fixed assets (goodwill, software, restructuring expenses, research and development expenses, minority interests, formation expenses, underwriting expenses, etc).
Total intermediated funds (F): Include current accounts, savings accounts, time deposits, repurchase agreements, as well as alternative funding sources (e.g. retail bonds).
The unit prices of the three respective inputs (w 1 , w 2 , and w 3 ) are defined as follows:
Unit price of labor (w 1 ): Ratio of personnel expenses to total labor. Personnel expenses include wages and salaries, social security contributions, contributions to pension funds, and other staff-related expenses.
Unit price of funds (w 2 ): Ratio of interest expenses to total funds. Interest expenses include interest paid on deposits and other sources of funds.
Unit price of physical capital (w 3 ): Ratio of administrative expenses to fixed assets.
Administrative expenses include rents, service charges, security, information systems and communications, other office and insurance expenses, professional charges, publicity and advertising, and depreciation.
Finally, regarding the RT, TR stands for real total revenue (this refers to real total operating income, which includes interest income, dividend income, fee and commission income, gains less losses from securities, and other operating income). In Table 3 we report banking indicators of the variables described above for the period 1993-2004.
Empirical results
In Tables 4-7 we present the empirical results of the static and dynamic CPM and
RT. There are four pairs of columns in each table. In the first, we provide the results of the basic models, as described in Section 4. In the second, the real variables are replaced by nominal ones (in order to be consistent with the part of the literature that uses nominal variables), while in the third we include a quadratic time trend, to capture any trends in output prices and revenues in the CPM and RT, respectively. Finally, in the fourth pair of columns, we add time dummies for all years (time fixed effects), thus modifying the model to a three-way error component (see Baltagi, 2005) . The time dummy specification is more general than the linear trend specification, as it will pick up potential trends of the variables used and more complex bank-level patterns. 22 All these modifications are applied on a oneby-one basis and not in a cumulative manner; so, for example, the modified model containing time dummies for every year does not also contain a trend, and the amounts it uses are real. The lag length in the dynamic models is set to one, which rejects autocorrelation; hence higher order autocorrelation is not accounted for in the regressions (this is expected given the fact that the data are annual).
Static CPM
The results obtained by running the 3SLS estimation procedure on System (6) are presented in Table 4 . The R-square statistics of both demand and supply relations, ranging from 0.89 to 0.96, indicate fine goodness of fit. The Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic reveals possible autocorrelation in the supply equation, which is a common problem in the literature (see Toolsema, 2002) , whereas the DW statistic of the demand equation surprisingly rejects the hypothesis of serial correlation. All parameters of the demand relation were found to be statistically significant, which is a crucial factor in the identification of L (except the intercorrelation variable YZ when nominal amounts are used). In particular, the coefficient on P is negative and statistically significant, meaning that the demand function is decreasing in its own price, as expected. The negative sign on Y suggests that income refers to the ability to pay for the goods bought with consumer credit, in the sense that high income may imply less need for such credit (Toolsema, 2002) . On the other hand the coefficient of the Greek government bond yield (Z) is positive and statistically significant, implying that our choice of Z is well suited as the price of a substitute.
In the supply equation, the parameters were not all statistically significant, which may be due to the dynamic nature of output and inputs in banking (especially when we include time dummies most t-statistics decrease). The coefficient on the unit price of labor contrasts our expectations, a fact that may be due to the labor surplus in the beginning of the period examined and the gradual reduction in labor expenses by Greek banks in order to improve their operating efficiency. In contrast, the coefficients of the other two inputs have the expected sign. 22 The coefficients of the time dummies are not reported in the tables owing to space considerations.
The estimate of market power, L, is very close to zero in all cases and the corresponding t-statistics are small, indicating that L is not significantly different from zero.
Thus, the static CPM analysis specifies that the Greek banking market is characterized by perfect competition. This means that the high degree of concentration characterizing the Greek banking industry reflects the efforts by the most efficient banks to take advantage of economies of scale and scope and does not necessarily influence competition in a negative manner. This conclusion is different from the results of studies of market power in banking sectors of several European countries, which generally find evidence of monopolistic competition or collusive conduct.
Dynamic CPM
The results obtained by examining the dynamic CPM are presented in Table 5 .
Once again, as in the static model, the parameters in the demand equation are strongly statistically significant at the 5 per cent level of significance, the only exception being the coefficient of the cross-term PZ when nominal values are applied. The R-square statistic of the supply relation attains values slightly higher compared to that of the static CPM, which
indicates that the dynamic model contains somewhat more information, especially for input prices. The Durbin-Watson statistic is also improved, verifying that the autocorrelated errors can be made to disappear by incorporating additional dynamics; as Kennedy (2003) states, modern econometric models typically have a rich dynamic structure and only seldom involve autocorrelated errors. The signs of the estimated coefficients are unchanged; however the t-statistics of both bank output and inputs (especially for w 2 ) are strengthened.
The estimate of market power, L, is positive and close to zero (yet with a significantly higher t-statistic), except the one from the specification that includes time dummies. In the latter case, L is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level of significance. This is a striking result since we cannot accept the interpretation of perfect competition as in the static CPM, meaning that some form of collusive behavior characterizes the Greek banking sector. 23 Such an outcome may imply that the dynamics inherent in the use of bank-level data mask -to some extent -the market power exercised in the industry, a result effectively towards the same direction with the theoretical considerations of Corts (1999) . To this end a dynamic CPM model may be a more appropriate specification.
Static RT
The competitive position tests of the static RT are presented in Table 6 . In all reveals that the H-statistic differs significantly from both zero and unity and, therefore, the hypotheses of both monopoly and perfect competition are rejected. Given the discussion in Sections 2 and 3, the dominant market form suggested by the static RT is monopolistic competition. Finally, we test for long-run equilibrium using the return on assets as the dependent variable. The Wald test performed does not reject the hypothesis of equilibrium (H n = 0) at conventional statistical levels (x 2 (4) = 52.93, p-value = 0.000), which implies that our analysis is well specified. Table 7 presents the results of the dynamic RT model (Eq. 10). In this specification, the significance of the input prices falls compared to the static RT (only the coefficient on 
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The signs found are consistent with the view that the CPM and RT offer similar conclusions regarding the structure of the Greek banking sector. Yet, both dynamic models indicate at least some anticompetitive behavior of banks, while their static counterparts point towards competitive conduct. These results have noteworthy implications for researchers and policy makers, as they challenge the dominant arguments regarding the structure of the Greek banking sector. One could elicit further information if these models were compared to a variety of differently structured banking systems or if they were extended to account for the critiques of the NEIO literature (e.g. Corts, 1999 ). Yet, before we move on to another issue we had better bring this entry to a close.
Concluding remarks
Contrary to standard accounts, we have used both a CPM and a RT to assess competitive conditions in a specific banking industry. The analysis further distinguished between static and dynamic versions of these models in order to substantiate whether predictions regarding the market structure remained unchanged. We tested the four resulting specifications, using panel data from the Greek banking industry over the period 1993-2004. We contend that our results indicate that both static models tend to underestimate the level of market power. In particular, while the static CPM and RT indicate no anticompetitive conduct and monopolistic competition respectively, their dynamic counterparts signal some anticompetitive behavior of banks. This is especially true for the dynamic RT, and for the dynamic CPM when time dummy variables are included in its empirical specification. We may partially attribute the mask of market power by static models to the important dynamics that characterized the Greek banking sector during the examined period, which were not reflected in the empirical specifications of either the static CPM or the static RT. These results hold consistently across a number of econometric specifications and estimation methods, as applied separately to the static and dynamic models, enhancing some recent critiques regarding the suitability of static NEIO models to robustly estimate market power.
At a broader level of analysis the conclusions of the present article underline the crucial relevance of the special features of the examined banking industry and they highlight the need to develop more appropriate empirical methodologies to characterize the level of collusive behavior in banking. 1993-1996 1993-2004 This table reports the Greek commercial banks constituting the sample (only one foreign-owned bank is included, namely Bank of Cyrpus). Source: Annual Balance Sheet and Income Statements of Greek Commercial Banks, 1993 Banks, -2004 The table reports the results arising from the estimation of the static CPM (System 6). q: total assets at the end of each year (in millions of euros); P: the ratio of annual interest income to total assets; Y: the gross domestic product (in billions of euros); Z: the 10-year Greek government bond yield (used as a substitute for bank deposits, in percentage units); w 1 : the ratio of personnel expenses per employee (in thousand of euros); w 2 : the ratio of interest expense per total funds (in percentage units); w 3 : the ratio of administrative expenses per fixed assets (in percentage units). Coefficient estimates, with corresponding t-statistics for four variants of the model; R-sq: the R-squared value of the equation; DW: Durbin-Watson statistic; Obs: number of observations. The table reports the results arising from the estimation of the dynamic CPM (System 7 and 8). q: total assets at the end of each year (in millions of euros); P: the ratio of annual interest income to total assets; Y: the gross domestic product (in billions of euros); Z: the 10-year Greek government bond yield (used as a substitute for bank deposits, in percentage units); w 1 : the ratio of personnel expenses per employee (in thousand of euros); w 2 : the ratio of interest expense per total funds (in percentage units); w 3 : the ratio of administrative expenses per fixed assets (in percentage units 
